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Introduction
We analyze the Spanish monetary system from 1856, when the Bank of Spain was 'created', to 1874, when it was awarded the monopoly of emission. This period was characterized by the coexistence of the Bank of Spain and other local banks of issue in a system of fractional-reserve banking. In this paper we describe the origins and operation of such a system. In particular, we focus on two issues: i) the lack of a lender of last resort due to the atomization of the system, which had dramatic consequences during the banking panic of 1866; ii) the role of the large fluctuations in the money supply in the Spanish crisis of the years 1864-1866.
The 'creation' of the Bank of Spain in 1856 was not the first attempt to introduce a bank of issue in Spain. The first bank of issue had been the Bank of San Carlos, renamed in 1829 as Banco de San Fernando. In the early 1850s, Spain experienced a shortage in the money supply and the Bank of San Fernando was constantly at its maximum legal emission volume of banknotes. At this time, a debate emerged on the way to increase the money supply. The response of the Government was to introduce, together with other liberal laws, the Law of Banks of Issue, which broke the monopoly of emission of the Bank of San Fernando, renamed as the Bank of Spain, by creating a system of multiple banks of issue. New banks had the monopoly of emission in their cities, while the Bank of Spain had the monopoly of emission in Madrid and in any place where no bank of issue was to be created. Thus, the Bank of Spain was created not as the sole bank of issue in the country, but as primus inter pares.
This arrangement had many similarities with free banking systems, such as those of Scotland or the United States in the 19 th century. Any entrepreneur was free to open a new bank of issue in any Spanish city where there were no existing issuer or a branch of the Bank of Spain. These local banks were free to issue their own banknotes, to accept deposits, and to reject banknotes from other issuers. However, the system was not completely unregulated as the maximum volume of emission was limited to three times the capital and the amount of metallic reserves.
Together with the Law of Banks of Issue, the Government introduced other liberal laws in the period 1854-1856. In particular, the Railroads Law provided state aid for the construction of new railways lines, and the Joint Stock Banks Law defined the conditions for the establishment of investment banks similar to the recently created Crédit Mobilier in France. The new laws encouraged the increase of credit, money supply and economic activity, especially in the railways sector. Due to these laws, the Spanish economy experienced a sustained period of growth and development from 1856 to 1864. The international environment also supported the economic expansion of these years due to the large expansion in the world money supply following discoveries of new gold deposits in California, Australia and Russia. The limitations of the particular banking system in Spain became apparent during the international crisis of 1864-1866. The absence of a lender of last resort and the local structure of the system of banks of issue reduced the capabilities of any single bank to cope with the credit crunch, especially after the banking panic of May 1866 that followed the bankruptcy of the English stock-bank Overend, Gurney and Co. 1 The fiscal position of the Government severely constrained the conduct of monetary policy by the Bank of Spain. At the same time, the small size of the local banks of issue forced them to reduce the amount of banknotes in a more conservative way than the Bank of Spain, in order to limit the risks of a bank-run on banknotes. The consequence of the crisis was a collapse in the Spanish banking system that took several years to repair. This period of deleveraging and reconstruction came to an end in 1874, when the Government decided to award the Bank of Spain the monopoly of emission in the whole country, giving the rest of banks of issue the possibility of either to merge with the Bank or to operate solely as commercial banks.
To analyze the evolution of monetary aggregates during the period, we construct a database with information about the volume of metallic coins, banknotes and current accounts. The database is constructed by collecting dispersed information about net inflows and outflows of money from a variety of sources. 2 Our results indicate that most of the Spanish monetary base was composed of metal coins: on average, the volume of coins was 15 times larger than the volume of banknotes. This is evidence of the underdevelopment of the Spanish financial system at the time. In addition, we document the severe contraction in the money supply during the period 1856-1866 and its progressive recovery from 1868 to 1873. This contraction was the consequence of both the international crisis and the 'Gresham's Law'. The monetary imbalances due to the American Civil War induced a flow of silver towards Eastern countries. Spain had at the time a bimetallic system where the mint ratio between gold and silver was higher than the market ratio. In these conditions, large amounts of silver were drained from Spain, implying a decline in the money supply.
In addition to describing the historical context, this paper attempts to quantify the impact of the fluctuations in the money supply in the observed evolution of output and 1 The lack of a lender of last resort was common in European economies at the time, with the exception of England. See below for details.
2 In contrast to previous studies, such as Martin-Aceña and Pons (2005) , which compute the amount of gold and silver taken data from the mint, we analyze inflows and outflows of specie. The reason is that, due to the large capital and trade flows during the period, only employing coinage information may misrepresent the real amount of specie within the country.
prices. To this end, we calibrate a standard new Keynesian model as in Gali (2009) and Woodford (2003) . This microfounded general equilibrium model extends the traditional Keynesian IS-LM analysis with a forward-looking Phillips curve, and thus allows to analyze the effects of changes in the money supply on nominal and real variables. We assume that the money supply is characterized by an exogenous stochastic process that replicates the values in the data. Then, we compare the counterfactual evolution of output, inflation and interest rates with that in the data. We find that, in the model, the drop in the money supply from 1860 to 1866 implies large deflationary effects, which produce a fall of around 30 percent in output and around 10 percent in inflation. This prediction is in contrast with the historical data, in which output and inflation were roughly constant during the same period. Also, the effect of the recovery of money growth after 1867 on output and inflation is delayed in the data with respect to the model. These results indicate that the severe contraction in the money supply had a milder effect on the economy than the one predicted in the new Keynesian framework. This paper is related to two different strands of the literature. In the first place, it relates to previous studies of the Spanish economy in the 1856-1874 period, such as Fernández-Pulgar and Anes- Álvarez (1970) , Martín-Aceña (2000) , Sánchez-Albornoz (1966) , Sánchez-Ballesta and Bernal (2010) , Sardà (1998 ), Sudrià (1994 , Tedde (1999 Tedde ( , 2004 Tedde ( , 2006 and Tortella (1969 Tortella ( , 1973 . We complement this literature by focusing on the monetary aspects and international linkages of the boom and the bust. In the second place, this paper relates to the growing literature that employs dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models to analyze economic events before Bretton Woods. Most of these works, including Bordo et al. (1995 Bordo et al. ( , 2000 , Christiano et al. (2003) , Cole and Ohanian (1999) and Kehoe and Prescott (2002) , focus on the Great Depression.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the Spanish financial system in 1856. In section 3, we analyze the boom and bust cycle of the Spanish economy in the period 1856-1874, with a focus on the international crisis of 1864-1866 and its effects on the Spanish economy. In section 4, we introduce the dataset and discuss the evolution of money supply and its impact on output and prices in the context of the new Keynesian model. Finally, in section 5, we conclude. The Bank of Isabel II was controlled by a new generation of liberal entrepreneurs, such as José Salamanca, with strong links to the Government. In contrast with the Bank of San Fernando, which directed most of its credit to the Government, the Bank of Isabel II financed some private projects, such as the railway line Madrid-Aranjuez, and provided funds to speculate in stock markets. These loans were typically guaranteed by stocks and the borrowers were often members of the Governing Council of the Bank, especially José Salamanca. When the European economic crisis began in 1847, it was clear that most of the credits of the Bank of Isabel II would not be recovered. To avoid bankruptcy, José Salamanca himself became Finance Minister and leaded the merge of the Bank of Isabel II with the more conservative (and healthier) Bank of San Fernando in a new institution, which retained the name of Bank of San Fernando.
During the period 1849-1854, the working of the Bank was reorganized by a couple of laws, one in 1849 and the other 1851. The capital of the Bank was set to 30 million pesetas, and the maximum volume of banknotes was limited to the same amount as the capital. The maximum ratio of banknotes over metallic reserves was set to three and no lending was permitted if the collateral were stocks of the Bank. During this period the new Governor of the Bank, Ramón Santillán, redirected most of the profits to mitigate 3 Tedde (2006) (1999) . 5 Spanish total population increased, since 1820 to 1850, from 11.7 to 15.3 millions of inhabitants, which implies a rate of growth of 0.9 per cent, higher than in the rest of Southern Europe. See Perez-Moreda (1985, pp. 25-61) .
6 See Carreras and Tafunell (2010) . The countries were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Nederland, Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Austria, and Spain. 7 The product of all these disposals was earned by the Treasury as extraordinary revenues during the years that this process lasted. In fact, the complete sale of public and Church properties almost took until the end of the century, due to magnitude of the transaction and because the majority of the buyers paid the properties in installments, the payment of a single property normally lasting fifteen annuities. the possibility of foreign investment in the stock of the railways companies, the total exemption of custom tariffs in the import of iron, machinery, wagons and other transport equipment, and the public subsiding of, at most, the third part of the construction budget. The third one, 'Joint Stock Banks Law' (Ley General de Sociedades de Crédito) defined the conditions for the establishment of sociedades de crédito, that is, investment banks similar to the recently created Crédit Mobilier in France and the English joint stock banks. A joint stock bank was a new form of financial enterprise to furnish funds for new enterprises upon pledge of its stock. For example, a proposed railway did not have to await the slow process of placing its stock and bonds among investors, in order to obtain funds to begin construction, but would deposit these securities in a joint stock bank, which would agree to accept its debts for a specified sum. These joint stock banks were able to sell their own shares and thus obtain the funds to make advances to the railways companies. In addition, the principle of limited liability reduced the risks for stockholders.
The arising of joint stock banks had happened in France in advance of England or The craze for the sociedades de crédito in Spain was quite similar to that in England for the joint stock banks. The consequence of the Ley de Sociedades de Crédito was the emergence of a great number of sociedades de crédito during the period 1856-1864 ( Table   1 ). The largest among them were the Crédito Mobiliario Español, created by the Pereire brothers, the Sociedad Española Mercantil e Industrial, owned by the Rothschild, and the Compañía General de Crédito en España, which was property of a group of French entrepreneurs leaded by Alfred Prost. All these three banks accounted for a capital of 162.5 millions of pesetas; the most prominent one was the Crédito Mobiliario Español, with a capital of 114 millions of pesetas.
The 1856 Law of Banks of Issue (Ley de Bancos de Emisión)
The last of the liberal laws approved in 1856 concerned the establishment of new banks of issue and the regulation of existing ones. The 1851 legislation had strongly limited the maximum emission volume to the bank capital, with deflationary consequences for the economy. During the period 1851-1855, the Bank of San Fernando always kept a volume of emission equal to the legal maximum, which implies that the Spanish economy was demanding more liquidity than it was supplied.
10 In this context, some of the most prominent private bankers, typically also shareholders in the Bank of San Fernando, were making pressure on the Government to pass a new law that allow the Bank to increase its volume of banknotes. At the same time, a coalition of regional businessmen and foreign bankers was asking to break the emission monopoly of the Bank, or at least to replicate it at a smaller scale in other Spanish cities. The response of the Government was to begin the discussion in the Parliament of a new law to improve the banking system. During the last months of 1855, there was an intense debate at the Parliament between proponents of a system with a single bank of issue, leaded by the Governor of the Bank of San Fernando, Ramón Santillán, and those that argued for a pseudo-free-banking system of multiple local monopolies. At the time, most European countries were moving toward centralized systems. Nevertheless, the law finally broke the emission monopoly of the be created. With respect to the emission volume, the law entitled new and old banks of issue to emit banknotes in a volume of less than three times the amount of their metallic reserves, as in the 1851 law. The novelty was that the volume of banknotes was now limited by three times the amount of the initial capital, that is, a threefold expansion from the existing situation. Finally, the Government was responsible for the appointment of the Governor of the Bank of Spain and of the rest of the banks of issue.
As a consequence of this law, the Bank of Spain was created not as the sole bank of issue in the country, but as primus inter pares. This particular institutional design had important implications in the next decade, as discussed in section 3.
3 The Evolution of the Financial System 1856-1874
The Boom Years 1856-1863
In the period 1856 the Spanish economy experienced a sustained period of growth and development. The new laws encouraged the increase of credit, money supply and economic activity. Joint stock banks channeled funds from investors to industrial projects, mainly railroads and, to a minor extent, mining. Through them, foreign capital entered Spain in an unprecedented volume since the times of the American colonies. As in the case of England, the emergence of the sociedades de crédito increased the volume of credit in the Spanish economy. It is estimated that more than 600 million reales of foreign capital were invested in sociedades de crédito, roughly 60 per cent of their total capital. The effect was to direct huge volumes of capital towards the railroad sector. As shown in Table 2 , most of the capital invested in stock companies during the period 1859-1866 went to railroad companies. It was followed by investment in sociedades de crédito, which was typically reinvested in railroads. The manufacturing sector received only a tiny part of the funds.
In 1864, for example, only 98 million pesetas out of 1000 were invested in manufacturing (textile, mining, steel, etc.) .
From 1856 to 1864 eleven banks of issue were opened in some of the more marketoriented towns, like the earlier Barcelona and Cadiz banks: Bilbao, Sevilla, Santander, Malaga, Jerez, Zaragoza, among others. Their aggregate paid-up capital in 1864 was 36.5 millions of pesetas, compared to 40.6 millions of pesetas of the Bank of Spain. Before 1874, the Bank of Spain only realized the opportunity of opening local branches in two places, Valencia and Alicante, both on the Mediterranean coast. 11 The law of banks of issue was successful in its attempt to increase the circulation of banknotes in Spain, which grew steadily from 1856 to 1863. The aggregate emission volume never reached its limit:
11 Tedde, (2006, pp. 88-89) .
the ratio of banknotes over metallic reserves was always below the legal maximum of three, a distinct feature with respect to the period pre-1856. During this period, the Bank of Spain became more involved in the financing of the Government. The various sovereign defaults of the previous decades had closed the access to the international financial markets to the Spanish public debt. The consequence was that the Spanish Government was in need of economic resources in order to finance its program of public works such as road constructions and subsidies to the railways companies. For this reason, the Finance Minister, Pedro Salaverría, decided to issue a special kind of public bonds, the Treasury bills (billetes del tesoro), for an amount of 400 millions of pesetas, guaranteed by the properties expropriated in the desamortización; almost all these bonds were purchased by the Bank of Spain. In 1864, Salaverría took the decision of directly involving the Bank of Spain in the policy of sale of public properties. The sales receipts of the public properties were delivered to the Bank, who had to accomplish their collect. For its part, the Bank of Spain created a new asset, the Mortgage Bill (billete hipotecario), with an interest of 6 per cent, which was backed by those receipts. The whole amount obtained in the placement of the Mortgage Bills had to be transferred by the Bank to the Treasury. By involving the Bank of Spain, the Government expected to sold these bills at higher prices due to the solvency of the Bank. On the side of the Bank, the deal seemed sound and profitable due to the strong guarantee of the assets. The international environment also supported the economic expansion of these years.
In the decade of the 1850s and early 1860s there was a large increase in the world money supply caused by the increase in the gold production after 1848, when new deposits were discovered in California, Australia and Russia. 
The Crisis 1864-1866
In the year 1864-1866 an international crisis affected most European countries. The roots of the crisis are diverse. 13 In many countries the emergence of joint stock banks had 12 Conant (1896, p. 500) . 13 Although there is little doubt that both the panics of January 1864 in France and May 1866 in London were but two scenes of the same plot, some authors have often classified them as two distinct crises. Notwithstanding, Hawtrey makes the point that the English crisis was not isolated but a sequel generated a tremendous expansion in money and credit in the late 1850s and early 1860s. 14 When the American Civil War (1861-1865) produced the blockade of the Southern ports and reduced the supply of cotton for European mills, the price of cotton rocketed. Cotton prices increased fourfold from 1860 to 1864. Speculation in cotton, and to a minor extent in railways, was fuelled by the increase in leverage possible thanks to the emergence of joint stock banks.
The silver drain and trade deficits of European countries and the troubles in European politics caused by the Prussian hegemonic policy inspired by Bismarck, provoked continuous fluctuations of the discount rates of the main European central banks. In the United Kingdom, in late 1863, the discount rate of the Bank of England was raised from 4% in November to 8% in December. 15 Other European banks followed the same line to avoid running out of reserves. The Bank of France raised the discount rate to 8% and purchased bullion, from January to November, to the amount of 221 million francs.
The cotton bubble could not be indefinitely sustained. The abrupt tightening of monetary policy amid a climate of pessimistic expectations generated a financial crisis that affected many banks and businesses and brought the speculative climate of the previous years to a halt.
The scarcity of specie was a key question for many European countries that had at that time large deficits in their balances of payments. In the case of Spain, the international crisis produced a tremendous impact on its monetary and financial system. The reasons why the collapse in money an credit was so massive in Spain should be traced back to the institutional design of the Spanish monetary system. In the first place, the fiscal position of the Government severely constrained the conduct of monetary policy by the Bank of Spain. During the crisis, Government pressures prevented the Bank from selling part of its portfolio in order to obtain additional liquidity. Therefore, the Bank of Spain was forced both to drastically reduce the volume of banknotes and to raise interest rates from 6 to 9 percent. 16 The Bank of Spain was in dire straits when the public required, in a tumultuous way, the payment in specie of their bills, under the suspect that there was an excessive engagement of the Bank with the Treasury, perceived to be at the edge of insolvency.
to the continental crisis of 1864. See Hawtrey (1979, p. 177) . See also Kindleberger and Aliber (2005, p. 117) and Flandreau (1995) . Secondary causes are mentioned in Foucaud (2006, p. 56) and in Cottrell (1980) . 14 For example, deposits in London joint stock banks, increased from £43 millions in 1860 to £91 millions in 1864, when the nominal capital of the new limited companies surpassed the £500 millions. See Juglar (1967,p. 385) .
15 See Homer and Sylla, (1963 pp.208-209) and Clapham (1944, vol. II pp. 259-260) .. 16 Tortella (1973, pp. 254-262) .
In the second place, the local structure of the system of banks of issue reduced the capabilities of any single bank to cope with the credit crunch. Whereas the Bank of Spain represented half of the Spanish monetary system, the other half was a system of 20 local banks of issue. When the crisis began, the small size of these banks forced them to reduce the amount of banknotes in a more conservative way than the Bank of Spain, in order to reduce the risks of a bank-run on banknotes. The decision in 1865 of the Spanish Government to instruct the trade courts to delay as much as possible all the cases involving convertibility of banknotes into metallic only made matters worse. This decision created a legal vacuum where convertibility was decided case by case by each of the local banks of issue and the Bank of Spain. 17 The consequence was the mistrust by the public in the banknotes of many of the local banks. Finally, the initial monetary shock was amplified through the value of the collateral of the financial system. In this case, the collateral was mainly stocks in railroad companies.
Due to scarcity of specie, the sociedades de crédito and local banks of issue were forced to sell their assets in order to get some liquidity. The problem was that the massive selling of assets only depressed stock prices even further, thus reducing even more the value of the banks' assets and their solvency. Hence, the Spanish economy experienced the consequences of a financial accelerator during the period 1864-1866. that severely affected the already weak health of banks and firms, not only in England, but also in continental Europe. In Italy, for example, the Government was forced to introduce the corso forzoso on May 11 th , which represented a suspension of the convertibility of the lira into gold and an additional supply of 250 million lire by the Bank of Italy.
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The impact of the financial crisis of May 1866 was amplified in Spain due to some policy mistakes. In the Spring of 1866, the Government had proposed an heterodox approach to solve its financing problems. The idea was to receive a loan of 100 million pesetas from an English bank syndicate leaded by Overend, Gurney and Co. in exchange for the rights of banknote emission in the whole country, that is, the suppression of the Bank of Spain and the rest of banks of issue and the creation of a new national bank of issue in the hands of the English bankers. The directors of the Bank of Spain strongly opposed the operation, which was aborted due to the failure of Overend. On May 11 th , when the news about the failure of Overend arrived, the panic extended to many Spanish cities, especially Barcelona. On May 12 th , the Catalana General de Crédito and the Crédito Mobiliario Barcelonés, two sociedades de credito, suspended payments. After that, a 20 "Panic, true panic came with unexpected speed and violence that day", says Clapham (1944, pp. 261-266 chain of bankruptcies extended through the country. The passivity of the Spanish authorities contrasts with the English case, where the Government and the Bank of England cooperated to minimize the crisis and provide extra liquidity during the panic. The practice of providing extra liquidity at penalty rates was not in accordance with the actual orthodox nancial theory. In fact, the Central Bank´s role of lender of last resort was not respectable among theorists until Bagehot´s Lombard Street, appeared in 1873. Notwithstanding, in England, the Bank Charter Act had been already suspended during the 1847 and 1857 crisis. In these cases the Bank of England acted as a lender of last resort even if it had no explicit mandate about it.
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In Spain, however, the Bank of Spain and the local banks of issue considered each other as competitors, so they felt no motivation to help. Besides, without any determination by the Government to suspend convertibility at a national level, any attempt to provide liquidity would have been useless. The consequence was a severe collapse of the nancial system in 1866 that ampli cated the monetary shock by reducing the volume of banknotes and deposits.
The consequence of the crisis was a collapse in the Spanish banking system that took several years to repair. When the crisis was over, more than 40 per cent of the Spanish nancial system had been o cially liquidated. The Bank of Spain bought during that period 238 million reales of gold and silver bullion, whereas the volume of banknotes did not grow signi cantly.
This period of deleveraging and reconstruction came to an end in 1874, when the Government decided to award the Bank of Spain the monopoly of emission in the whole country in exchange for a loan of 125 million pesetas. The rest of banks of issue were given the possibility of either to merge with the Bank or to operate solely as commercial banks. On March 19 1874, the Bank of Spain became the only bank of issue in Spain.
Monetary dynamics
The aim of this section is to analyze the evolution of monetary dynamics during the period 1856-1873. To this end, we have constructed a historical database with information about aggregate monetary variables. The description of the database can be found in Appendix B. Here, we rst describe the data about money supply and its components. Then, we use 24 Collins (1992) analyzes the role of the Bank of England as a lender of last resort in the 1866 crisis compared to the ones of 1857 and 1878. He concludes that the Bank of England acted as a de facto lender of last resort. Not was until 1890 that this responsibility was entirely displayed, during the Baring crisis, although it ever remained doubtful about possible contradictions between the maintenance of gold standard and the function of lender of last resort. See also Bignon, Flandreau and Ugolini (2011), McKinnon (1993) and Eichengreen (1996) . a standard New Keynesian model to quantify the impact of monetary policy on output and prices during the period. Table 3 and Figure 1 present the data about the evolution of money supply and its components. We define money supply as the sum of the currency (banknotes and coins) plus current accounts in the banks of issue minus the metallic reserves of the system of banks of issue. Two features should be noticed. Firstly, metal coins were by far the bulk of the monetary base. On average the volume of coins was 15 times larger than the volume of banknotes. This is the most explicit evidence of the underdevelopment of the Spanish financial system during the first half of the 19 th century. Secondly, the evolution of the money supply displays a contraction during the period 1856-1866 and a progressive recovery from 1868 to 1873.
Money Supply and Components
The outflow of currency in the period 1856-1866 was mainly due to the effects of 'Gresham's Law'. Market and mint ratios between gold and silver were different in Spain, making silver coins cheaper and thus creating an incentive to export silver. The fall in the market price of gold to silver was due to the gold discoveries in California in 1848 and Australia in 1851. These discoveries increased tenfold world gold production. In 1851, the Government had suspended gold coinage in an attempt to stop silver outflows. The law did not succeed at stopping silver exports, but it aggravated the reduction in the monetary base. The prohibition was ruled out in 1854 and silver prices were corrected to more sensible levels. However, the continuous rise of silver prices in the world markets made it necessary to reform again the Spanish currency system in 1861 and 1864. These reforms realigned silver and gold prices and rationalized a complex system of coinage. 25 The 1864 currency reform temporarily solved these problems by modifying the metallic content of silver coins and hence devaluing their metallic value in relation to their face value. The new mint ratio was set to 15. The net flow of currency can be decomposed in three components, as shown in Table 4 and Figure 2 . In the first place, the large trade deficit, which peaked in 1863. Part of this trade deficit was a consequence of the massive import of materials for the construction of the new railways. In the second place, the large amounts of foreign capital that entered the country to be invested in railways. This capital came mainly from France and Belgium, as the English capital market was closed to Spain since the debt restructuring of Bravo Murillo in 1851. In the third place, the payment of interests on public and private debt and dividends on stocks. Before 1866, the outflow was larger as capital inflows were not enough to compensate the trade deficit plus interests and dividends. The situation reversed after 1867, due to the strong adjustment in the trade balance during the crisis and to the large inflows of foreign capital to finance new emissions of public debt. Figure 3 shows the evolution of banknotes and current accounts. During the boom years, the volume of banknotes grew due to the emission by the new local banks and to the relaxation in the ratio of banknotes over metallic reserves. When the crisis began and due to the scarcity of metallic reserves, banks were forced to reduce the volume of banknotes to minimize the risk of a bank-run on the banknotes. As shown in Figure 4 , the ratio of banknotes over metallic for the aggregate of local banks of issue was below 1.5. Some of them, such as the Bank of Barcelona operated with ratios of less than 1, that is, all the banknotes were covered by specie ('narrow banking'). This is a very low level of emission, providing that the 1856 law entitled banks to emit banknotes in a volume of less than three times the amount of their metallic reserves.
The Bank of Spain also contributed to the collapse in money and credit. To avoid running out of reserves, the Bank of Spain began a tightening of its monetary policy and raised interest rates to 9 percent at the end of 1864, keeping it at this level until the end of 1866. It also tried to buy bullion in foreign markets. The result was an increase in its reserves, which reached 27 million pesetas in 1865. Simultaneously, its volume of banknotes fell from 71 million pesetas in 1864 to 61 in 1865 and then again to 44 in 1866. The fall in current accounts was also dramatic, from 56 million pesetas in 1863 to 22 millions in 1866. The consequence was an abrupt decline in the ratio of banknotes over metallic reserves in 1865 and 1866. which generated a depreciation of the Spanish Real against the Pound and the Franc.
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From 1869 onwards, capital and trade inflows surpassed the outflows, which produced an appreciation of the currency, albeit quite volatile due to the turbulent political and economic situation at the time.
The effects of monetary fluctuations
In this subsection we use the dataset to quantify the impact of the fluctuations in the money supply in the observed evolution of output and prices. To this end, we compare the counterfactual results from a calibrated new Keynesian DSGE model that replicated the evolution in the money supply with the data in the 1856-1873 period. 28 We choose the new Keynesian model as it represents the current benchmark in the analysis of monetary economics. We consider a very stylized framework, as in Gali (2009, Ch. 3) or Woodford Our specification is such that, by log-linearizing the first order conditions of the household and the firm problems around a zero inflation steady state, it is possible to derive the complete system of forward-looking equations. The IS relationship is given by
where y t represents the percentage deviation of output from its long-run trend, i t is the nominal interest rate and π t is the inflation rate. The Phillips curve is given by
where κ = (ϕ+1)(1−θ)(1−βθ) θ is the slope of the Phillips curve, ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, β is the subjective discount factor of households and θ is the proportion of firms allowed to change price in each period.
The LM equation relates real money balances with nominal interest rates:
where l t ≡ m t − p t are real money balances. Finally, the law of motion of real money balances is where Δm t ≡ log M t − log M t−1 is the money growth rate of the money supply.
A common assumption in the new Keynesian literature is that monetary policy is conducted by adjusting the nominal interest rate. However, this description does not seem to fit with the Spanish experience of the 1850s and 1860s, during which the nominal rate responded endogenously to changes in the metallic reserves of the banks of issue. For this reason, we consider instead that the evolution of the money supply followed an exogenous path given by
where ε mt
. This modelling strategy intends to reflect the exogenous changes in the money supply due to the inflows and outflows of specie and to the issuing decisions of a multiplicity of independent banks.
The model composed of (1), (2), (3) and (4) is a rational expectations linear system in y t π t , i t , l t and Δm t , which can be solved using standard techniques. 29 We ignore technology and preference shocks to focus solely on the impact of monetary shocks.
The calibration of the model is as follows. First, as the average inflation rate during the period 1856-1873 is zero, we assume inflation to be zero in the steady-state of the model. Next, we set the subjective discount factor β to 0.96 to match a nominal interest rate of 6% in the steady state, which is the average value during the period 1856-1873. We estimate the money supply process (5) by OLS and obtain ρ m = 0.56 and σ m = 0.07. We are not able to directly estimate from the data the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ and the frequency of price adjustment θ. Thus, we set ϕ = 1 as in Christiano, Eichembaum and Evans (2005) and consider a value of θ = 0.75, which implies an average frequency of price adjustments of one year, a common assumption in the new Keynesian literature that seems plausible for the period. Figure 6 compares the model results with the data. In particular, we estimate a sequence of shocks to money supply growth such that the money supply predicted by the model matches exactly the actual money supply observed in the data (see bottom right panel). Figure 6 also displays the performance of output, inflation and the interest rate in the data and in the model. In the data, there is a large drop in money growth between 1860 and 1866. In the model, this drop in the money supply implies large deflationary effects, which produce a fall of around 30% in output and around 10% in inflation. Strikingly, this prediction is in contrast with the data, that show that output and inflation were roughly constant during the 1860-1865 period.
30 Also, the recovery of money growth occurred in 29 See, for example, Blanchard-Kahn (1980) . 30 We also consider the inflation data from Sardà (1998), based on agricultural commodities and from Maluquer de Motes (2006) , based on prices at the Boqueria market in Barcelona. These series do not display any significant deflationary pressure between 1861 and 1865. However, it is important to notice 1867 appears to have a delayed effect in the data of output and inflation with respect to the model.
31
In Table 6 we report volatility statistics in the data and in the model. Given that we cannot estimate the frequency of price adjustment from the data, we consider three scenarios for the parameter θ: 0.50, 0.75 and 0.85. In the first case, prices are changed on average every six months. Although the volatility of output in the model is very close to that in the data, 6% versus 7%, inflation volatility is significantly larger in the model, 10.2% versus 4.3%. The large inflation volatility is due to the high frequency of price adjustment assumed. By increasing the value of θ, the volatility of output increases while that of inflation declines. With a value θ = 0.75, for which the average duration of a price is one year, both inflation and output in the model display a larger volatility in the model with respect to the data, 7.1% and 13.1%, respectively. Finally, for an average duration of roughly one year and a half, θ = 0.85, the volatility of inflation is close to that in the data, 5.8% versus 4.3%, but output volatility becomes very large, 17.7%. In this case the small frequency of price adjustment implies that monetary shocks have a large impact on output. In all cases, the volatility of the nominal interest rate is 0.6%.
We conclude that monetary shocks did not affect the economy as predicted by this stylized new Keynesian model. Nevertheless, it does not imply that new Keynesian theory cannot account for the observed evolution of variables in the period. It is possible that the Spanish economy was affected by a productivity shock that partially offset the effects of the money contraction. It is however difficult to identify this technological breakthrough in the Spanish economy of the 1860s. Another explanation is that the credit creation by the sociedades de credito could have partially compensated the outflow of spice. Unfortunately, we have not been able of collecting data on credit creation by these financial agents. Finally, it is also possible that more complex models might describe better the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates. In particular, the introduction of distortions à la Christiano, Eichembaum and Evans (2005) could help to explain the delay in the response to the monetary shock. 32 We leave all these open questions for future research.
the divergences in the data for this period. 31 Note that, as discussed in Galì (2008) , the new Keynesian model with exogenous money supply does not display the standard liquidity effect usually observed in the data after a monetary shock. Thus, a decline in the money supply in the model implies a slight decline in the nominal interest rate. 32 In addition, a small open-economy monetary model à la Gali and Monacelli (2005) might help to explain the large trade flows at that time and their impact on the economy.
Conclusion
In this paper we described the main characteristics of the historical context in which the Bank of Spain was created. In particular, we focus on the multiplicity of banks that were entitled to emit banknotes during the period 1856-1874. In this context, the Bank of Spain was only the largest issuer of banknotes in the country. This system was successful in expanding the volume of paper money during the expansion period, 1856-1864, but it also amplified the contraction during the 1864-1868 crisis. In particular, the lack of a lender of last resort might explain why the banking panic was so severe in Spain, in contrast to England, where the Bank of England acted as a de facto lender of last resort and convertibility was temporarily suspended. This paper also quantifies the economic effects of the monetary fluctuations. We find the puzzle that, despite the fact that the contraction of the money supply began in the early 1860s, the recession and deflation were delayed until 1868, in contrast to what is predicted by new Keynesian theory.
In addition, this paper contributes to the literature analyzing free banking systems. The Spanish monetary system during the period 1856-1874 shares many similarities with other historical episodes where a multiplicity of private banks had the right to emit banknotes. The year 1874 marks the transition from this type of system to a more standard one, with a single issuer of banknotes. This natural experiment can be analyzed in future research to understand the effects of a such a transition on the aggregate economy. , 28, 1 (2010 ), pp. 173-209. Sánchez-Albornoz, N., `De los Orígenes del Capital Financiero: la Sociedad General de Crédito Mobiliario Español, 1856 -1902 ' Moneda y Crédito 97 (1966 . Sánchez-Albornoz, N., España hace un siglo: una economía dual, (Alianza, Madrid, 1977) . Sánchez-Ballesta, J. P. and M. Bernal, `Monitoring, reputation and accountability in issuing banks in mid-nineteenth-century Spain, ' Explorations in Economic History, 47:4, pp. 403-419 (2010 Great Britain, 1865 -1914 . A Statistical Survey, (Macmillan, London, 1999 
Económic

The household problem
The intertemporal maximization problem of the household is
subject to
where η, ϕ, γ, χ are all positive parameters, C t is consumption, M t /P t real money balances, N t labor, B t bond holdings, P t the price of the consumption good, W t the real wage and Q t is the nominal price of bonds. Finally, P t Π t are nominal profits from the ownership of firms.
The first order conditions for this problem are summarized by the following three conditions
The consumption index of the household is given by
where > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods, and the corresponding price index is P t = 1 0
It follows that the demand function for good j is
The firm problem
All firms j ∈ [0, 1] produce a differentiated good using the same constant returns to scale technology with labor as the only input
Each period a fraction θ of randomly chosen firms in the economy is not allowed to change the price while the remaining 1 − θ will set prices optimally. The problem of a firm allowed to change prices at time t is
where
is the stochastic discount factor from t + k to t and MC t+k = W t+k P t+k A is the marginal cost.
Equilibrium and Money Supply
Market clearing in the goods market requires
and market clearing in the labor market requires
We consider an exogenous path for the growth rate of the money supply Δm t ≡ log M t − log M t−1 .
33 The process for the money growth rate is given by Broder (1976 Broder ( ,1981 and Tedde (1978, pp. 9-354) .
For banking investments, data have been collected from Sánchez-Albornoz (1977) , Tortella (1973 ), Broder (1976 and Tedde (1974) . The information about mining and metallurgy foreign investments come, for the British sources, from Stone (1999) and Harvey and Taylor (1987) . The French and Belgian data are drawn from Broder (1976 Broder ( ,1981 and from Chastagnaret (2000) . We also have consulted Tortella (2008) .The foreign investment data of public utilities, like light and water urban services, come from Stone (1999) and Costa-Campí (1982) . For new issues of Public Debt along the period 1868-1874 data are taken from Martín-Niño (1973) .
Finally, data on Foreign Capital Interests and Benefits, Repayments and Interests of Public Bonds and Transfers also come from several sources and we have applied for its completion some conjectures. So, we have supposed that the recurrent repayment of Public Debt was made by the buying of bonds by the Spanish Treasury, in the Stock Market, at current prices. This hypothesis is backed by some specialists in Spain's Financial History, as Artola (1986) and Comín (1988) . Also, we have supposed that the profitability of all the three private Banks in the form of Credit Mobilier that were created by French initiative at the middle of the 19 th Century was the same of the Sociedad de Crédito Mobiliario Español, of which we have some data from Sánchez-Albornoz (1977) . Similarly, we have speculated with equal dividends of railways companies, along this period, in term of percentage on capital share, to those paid off by the two major of them, the Compañía de Caminos de Hierro del Norte de España and Madrid-Zaragoza-Alicante; this last information is contained in Tedde (1978) . For mining and metallurgy profitability, we have taken the relative information from Harvey and Taylor (1987) , which cointains averages of dividend and interest payments for British investments. We have assumed that it can be acceptable to apply this rate of return to the French and Belgian investments in the same industry. For the public utilities investments we have applied the same real rate of return resulting from public bonds. Transfers data are directly taken form Prados de la Escosura (2010). 'BoS' refers to the Bank of Spain, 'Rest' is the rest of the banking system. All units are in million pesetas. 
